Last evening I attended an informal intimate gathering of less than two dozen to bid farewell to a senior civilian who has selflessly and faithfully served our country more than 30 years.
The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war. – Norman Schwarzkopf
A grand time.
No other Marines present.
Home late, an email from an old Marine pal, too retired, caught my attention.
He opined on yesterday’s commentary addressing Marine logic.
We see things differently.
Much of his note traced the history of the Infantry Officers Course (which I completed in the fall/winter 1980 and he, though an infantry officer, did not complete because his training preceded existence of the course).
That is, how the course morphed from inception to present physical challenge with mention of the players responsible for the shaping. Interesting. But relevancy? Not convinced. Why?
Awakened way too early this morning, let’s keep it simple …
The Marine Corps exists for one purpose—to fight.
1. Does it matter why and how the IOC morphed?
2. Can an individual Marine, especially ground combatant, be over-prepared to fight? And over-prepared to lead Marines in a fight?
3. Can a ground combat unit be over-prepared to fight?
4. Does being over-prepared increase the odds of surviving and winning the fight?
5. Does being under-prepared increase the odds of being killed and losing the fight?
6. Do not volunteers deserve the best and most demanding training (and weapons and equipment) so if ordered to fight they hold the upper hand for survival and unit victory?
And so on.
Wonder what the late General Schwarzkopf (U. S. Army) would think?
Until a more compelling (counter) argument is made, with General Barrow—a Marine who survived combat (hand-to-hand), led Marines (who survived) in combat (hand-to-hand), and won—I stand.
Again, in case you’ve not heard General Barrow’s sworn testimony: here.